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  Public officials often impose eligibility requirements for 
government programs that have two effects: (1) They screen out 
ineligible people and (2) they screen out eligible people. Consisting of 
paperwork requirements, interviews, waiting periods, and 
administrative burdens, such requirements are sometimes 
characterized as “sludge,” and for some eligible people, they might 
prove overwhelming or prohibitive. In these circumstances, there is a 
pervasive normative issue: What is the optimal tradeoff between the 
screening out of ineligible people and the screening out of eligible 
people? It is plausible to think that a great deal depends on numbers. 
If, for example, the number of ineligible people who are screened out 
is very large, and if the number of eligible people who are screened out 
is very small, then there would seem little ground for objection. But if 
the number of eligible people who are screened out is very large, there 
is a serious problem, and it might be worthwhile to consider an 
approach that would not screen out eligible people, even if it would 
simultaneously fail to screen out, or effectively “screen in,” a small 
number of ineligible people. We identify competing, plausible positions 
on the normative question, which we label consequentialist (in the sense 
that they attempt an assessment of the consequences of alternatives 
approaches, with a focus on numbers) and legalist (in the sense that 
they emphasize legal constraints, designed to ensure that benefits go 
only to those who are actually eligible). We also offer the results of a 
pilot study, which shows that the overwhelming majority of 
respondents would favor changes that allow ineligible people to receive 
benefits, if that is the price of ensuring that eligible people do so as 
well—unless the number of ineligible recipients is very high. The survey 
results suggest that most people reject the legalist position and embrace 
a form of consequentialism. We suggest that in light of the normative 
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analysis and the survey results, a form of consequentialism is best, 
unless the law explicitly forbids it. 
I.  A DILEMMA 
All over the world, governments face a pervasive dilemma with 
respect to eligibility requirements. A primary purpose of such 
requirements is to ensure that benefits go only to people who are 
actually eligible for them. But if the requirements are onerous, then 
many people who are eligible will not get them, simply because of that 
onerousness.1 Here, then, is the dilemma: more onerous requirements 
will reduce the likelihood that ineligible people will get benefits, while 
also increasing the likelihood that eligible people will not get benefits.  
Such eligibility requirements are sometimes described as 
“sludge,” defined as frictions, paperwork burdens, waiting time, 
interview requirements, or other administrative burdens that make it 
more difficult for people to obtain benefits.2 If, for example, people are 
required to fill out forms to obtain a visa, to get financial aid, or to 
obtain an occupational license, they are facing sludge. If they must go 
to an in-person interview before obtaining aid of one or another kind, 
sludge is also involved. Many federal and state programs are pervaded 
by sludge.3 But how much sludge is too much? On this definition, it 
should be clear that the optimal level is not zero. Some sludge is good 
or even essential. Above all, some sludge is necessary to ensure that 
resources or opportunities do not go to people who are ineligible for 
them. Indeed, some sludge might be legally mandatory.  
For many programs, an underlying goal of administrative burdens 
is to ensure “program integrity,”4 meant to refer to an absence of fraud, 
 
 1.  For examples, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J. 1843, 1849–51 
(2019). 
 2.  See id. (“The term should be taken to refer to the kind of friction, large or small, that 
people face when they want to go in one or another direction.”); Richard Thaler, Nudge, Not 
Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431, 431 (Aug. 3, 2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/361/6401/
431.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3VW-JJG4] (“But what about activities that are essentially nudging 
for evil? This ‘sludge’ just mucks things up and makes wise decision-making and prosocial activity 
more difficult.”). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript on 
file with authors).  
 3.  See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1862–64 (noting sludge in Obamacare and Medicare, as 
well as state regulations concerning abortion and voter registration).  
 4.  See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, tit. II, 129 
Stat. 2242, 3076–86 (2015) (referring to Title II as “Program Integrity” and specifically intending 
to reduce fraudulent and improper payments in the EITC and other programs); Leslie Book, 
David Williams & Krista Holub, Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve 
Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177, 180 (2018) (noting that “[p]rogram integrity” 
of the EITC was an important topic among employees of the IRS because 43 to 50 percent of all 
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abuse, misuse, or access by the ineligible; sludge might be necessary for 
that purpose. A large amount of sludge—paperwork burdens, delays, 
information collection—could be an essential way to limit benefits, 
including taxpayer money, to those who have a legal right to them. Of 
course it is also true that sludge might be a covert (or at least not readily 
visible) way to limit expenditures; a reflection of a compromise 
between those who like a benefits program and those who do not much 
like it; or a way for the government to acquire information that could 
be used for multiple purposes.5 But program integrity is often the 
central motivation.6 
As a case in point, consider the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(“EITC”),7 a wage subsidy for low-income workers, provided by the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).8 For the EITC, the take-up rate is 
about 80 percent.9 By the standards of most benefits programs, that 
number is not especially low. But if 20 percent of eligible people are 
not receiving a potentially life-changing benefit, and if the reason is the 
degree of sludge, there is a serious problem. An approach that denies 
such a benefit to millions of people surely should be rethought. The 
existing amount of sludge would seem excessive, and it should be 
reduced. 
The IRS almost certainly knows enough to enroll people 
automatically and send a refund to eligible taxpayers. If so, sludge 
could be eliminated entirely, and the take-up rate should be close to 
100 percent. Is that what the IRS should be doing?10 Suppose that the 
 
EITC returns are incorrect, with most errors benefitting claimants); Program Integrity, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-integrity/
index.html [https://perma.cc/2ZMC-XTSH] (explaining CMS responsibilities and goals under the 
Medicaid Integrity Program); Reducing Improper Payments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/improperpayments [https://perma.cc/T8ZN-XA32] (emphasizing the 
objective of curbing improper payments). 
 5.  See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1870–71 (pointing to sludge as a way to ration resources 
for those willing to tolerate administrative burdens); id. at 1872 (noting how certain administrative 
burdens help agencies collect useful data on public programs like employment training or 
infectious disease prevention efforts).  
 6.  See id. at 1865 (noting agencies impose paperwork burdens to ensure programs comply 
with the law). 
 7.  The details and requirements of the EITC are set out in 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2018). 
 8.  See PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: 
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 191, 193 (2019). For a general discussion of the EITC and its 
effects on recipients, see generally MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001). 
 9.  HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8, at 191.  
 10.  Surprisingly, there appears to be a lack of substantial literature on automatic enrollment 
and the EITC. But see Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging Savings Under the Earned Income Tax 
Credit: A Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 83, 112–21 (2010) (arguing that 
2020] OPTIMAL SLUDGE 77 
IRS indeed decided to send the EITC automatically to apparently 
eligible taxpayers. If it could do so at low cost, and if the apparently 
eligible taxpayers are in fact eligible, there would seem to be little 
ground for objection. The problem, of course, is the phrase “apparently 
eligible taxpayers.” It is possible that some of the recipients, under 
automatic enrollment, will not in fact be eligible. Whenever people are 
automatically enrolled in a program, some of them may not meet the 
legal criteria.  
Or consider the question of voting rights. With respect to both 
registration and voting, some states impose a degree of sludge, on the 
articulated ground that it is necessary to ensure that ineligible people 
do not end up voting.11 But what if the result is also, and 
simultaneously, to discourage eligible people from voting?12 What if 
sludge operates as a mechanism for voter suppression? That problem 
is pervasive.13 For benefits programs of multiple kinds, sludge might be 
justified as a way of ensuring that ineligible people do not gain access 
to goods or opportunities; but the consequence might be to screen out 
the eligible as well. If people have to navigate sludge to exercise their 
constitutional rights, there seems to be a serious problem. 
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part II 
explores the question of optimal sludge as a matter of principle. It 
shows that if we care about consequences, we might favor sludge 
reduction even if the consequence is to give benefits or opportunities 
to people who are ineligible. But if we want to insist on strict adherence 
to legal requirements, the grant of benefits to ineligible individuals is 
far worse than the denial of benefits, through sludge, to eligible 
individuals. Some statutes may, in fact, require sludge even if the 
overall consequences are plausibly described as very bad. Part III 
describes our survey, which found that most people embrace a form of 
consequentialism and firmly reject legalism. Part III also discusses 
differences along the lines of party affiliation and demographics; 
surprisingly, the survey found only modest differences along these 
 
the EITC should have a retirement savings component with automatic enrollment). This area 
deserves sustained study. 
 11.  See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8, at 47–79 (discussing the history of administrative 
burdens in the exercise of voting rights). 
 12.  See, e.g., id. at 56–57 (noting a survey among registered Texas voters found 6 percent of 
eligible voters said not having proper identification was “the primary reason they did not vote,” 
despite the interviewers finding that the “vast majority” did in fact have proper identification). 
 13.  Id. at 49; see also Vote Suppression, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/vote-suppression 
[https://perma.cc/9LBC-W3QD]. 
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lines. Part IV, a brief conclusion, argues in favor of sludge reduction on 
consequentialist grounds, even if the result is to give some benefits or 
opportunities to ineligible people. 
II.  NORMATIVE ISSUES 
Public officials must often choose between (1) a design ensuring 
that a certain number of eligible people will not receive a benefit and 
(2) a design ensuring that a certain number of ineligible people will 
receive a benefit. That may not be an easy choice, and it may not even 
be easy to decide on the criteria that officials should use to make it. On 
one view, we should focus on consequences, which means that we 
should try to specify relevant numbers: How many eligible people 
would obtain benefits to which they are entitled? How many ineligible 
people would obtain benefits to which they are not entitled? On 
another view, we should focus on the underlying statute and the class 
of people that it seeks to benefit, certainly if it mandates a particular 
conclusion, and perhaps even if it does not.  
A. Consequences and Consequentialism 
If the idea of program integrity is meant to refer to the number of 
errors, the choice between view (1) and view (2) above might turn on 
some kind of arithmetic. Which group is larger? If automatic 
enrollment means that 500,000 eligible people will receive a benefit 
who otherwise would not, but 499,999 ineligible people will also receive 
a benefit who otherwise would not, automatic enrollment is justified. 
Call this a consequentialist position; it is consequentialist in the sense 
that it assesses the optimal level of sludge by focusing on its 
consequences.  
To be sure, the consequentialist position might be specified in 
different ways, and a simple count might be too crude. It could be 
challenged from multiple points of view. Suppose that automatic 
enrollment gives benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also to 200,100 
ineligible people. Some people might think that if the 200,100 people 
are nearly eligible—if they are relatively poor—it is not so terrible if 
they receive some economic help. But other people might insist that 
taxpayer money is accompanied by clear restrictions and argue that if 
it is given out in violation of those restrictions, a grievous wrong has 
been committed. They might think that if automatic enrollment gives 
benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also to 125,000 ineligible people, 
it is a terrible idea. On consequentialist grounds, reasonable people 
could differ about the appropriate tradeoff; they may or may not 
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require a significant disparity between the size of the group of 
benefited eligible persons and the size of the group of benefited 
ineligible persons.  
We might agree that if sludge reduction or automatic enrollment 
ensures that a very large number of eligible people receive benefits 
who otherwise would not, and that a very small number of ineligible 
people also receive benefits who otherwise would not, all is well. 
Perhaps we could even agree that if sludge reduction or automatic 
enrollment ensures that a large number of eligible people receive 
benefits who otherwise would not, and that a significant number of 
ineligible people receive benefits who otherwise would not, all is still 
well. For example, in the context of COVID-19, the U.S. government 
eliminated a great deal of sludge to promote delivery of health and 
economic benefits.14 Even if those steps ultimately rewarded many 
people who were not in fact eligible, including people who were no 
longer alive,15 perhaps they were nonetheless justified. But reasonable 
people can disagree about these questions.16  
 
 14.  Specifically, the stimulus checks set out under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (“CARES”) Act , Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134 Stat. 281, 335 (2020), 
provide a good gauge of public sentiment regarding sludge in emergency scenarios. There were 
certainly concerned voices regarding the distribution of stimulus checks to deceased individuals 
as well as the living, but the speed at which the Treasury Department sent out the checks may 
have justified this oversight. See Erica Werner, Treasury Sent More than 1 Million Coronavirus 
Stimulus Payments to Dead People, Congressional Watchdog Finds, WASH. POST (June 25, 2020, 
8:09 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/06/25/irs-stimulus-checks-dead-
people-gao [https://perma.cc/529D-5XXQ]; Eric Levitz, Treasury Sent $1.4 Billion in Stimulus 
Checks to Dead People. That’s Good, N.Y. MAG: INTELLIGENCER (June 25, 2020), 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/irs-coronavirus-stimulus-checks-dead-people-gao.html 
[https://perma.cc/4AX7-TD3Z]. In fact, greater frustration was likely caused by the fact that while 
the dead received $1.4 billion in stimulus, tens of millions of living Americans did not see their 
checks at all. See Savannah Levins, Still No Stimulus Check? You’re Not Alone, WCNC (June 23, 
2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.wcnc.com/article/money/still-no-stimulus-check-youre-not-
alone/275-11793c79-7fb7-4201-9f42-343b6d602397 [https://perma.cc/CWJ8-J3JZ] (noting that 35 
million Americans still had not received their stimulus checks as of June 2020).  
 15.  See Werner, supra note 14 (describing how the Treasury Department and IRS 
mistakenly disbursed stimulus checks to almost 1.1 million dead people in the rush to quickly 
deliver payments). 
 16.  Compare John Kennedy, Sending Coronavirus Payments to Ghosts Hurts the Living, 
HILL (May 7, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/496615-sending-
coronavirus-payments-to-ghosts-hurts-the-living [https://perma.cc/6G7C-F5QS] (“Even under 
normal circumstances, we should not tolerate this level of waste and incompetence, but COVID-
19 has landed us far from normal times. . . . Even the most fiscally unfettered politician can’t 
justify cutting checks to people who are not even alive.”), with Levitz, supra note 14 (“The 
program had an error rate of roughly 0.4 percent. That is not a scandal. It is a triumph.”), and 
Cindy Carcamo, Why Are the Dead Getting Coronavirus Stimulus Checks?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-24/coronavirus-stimulus-
check-death-payment [https://perma.cc/3RPB-UF3D] (quoting a former head of an IRS 
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As usual, consequentialists need to specify what matters, so that 
we can know what counts as a good or bad consequence, and how good 
or bad it is. We should be able to agree that it is good, and often very 
good, to ensure that eligible people receive benefits to which they are 
entitled (especially if they are poor or sick). But how bad is it, exactly, 
if ineligible people receive such benefits as well? 
That question remains to be answered; consequentialism, in the 
abstract, cannot do so. In terms of drawing the right conclusion, we will 
also want to specify the substantive area that is involved. More or less 
sludge might be imposed and tolerated in such diverse domains as 
antipoverty programs, voting, abortion, student visas, and occupational 
licenses.17 In one area, reasonable consequentialists might be willing to 
accept a grant of a good or opportunity to a large number of ineligibles, 
without also committing themselves to the same level of toleration in 
another area. 
B. Legalism 
On an alternative view, even a modest breach of program 
integrity, for the advantage of those who are not eligible, is 
unacceptable. Call this the legalist position. It is legalist in the sense 
that it sees a violation of legal requirements as a serious breach, one 
that cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds. An extreme 
version of the legalist position would be that a grant of benefits to a 
very large number of eligible people would not outweigh the grant of 
benefits to a very small number of ineligible people.  
We need to make a distinction here. Suppose that the law is 
conclusive on the question. Suppose that properly read, it mandates a 
degree of sludge. Or suppose that it forbids officials from taking steps 
to provide benefits to small numbers of ineligible people, even if those 
steps are necessary to ensure that benefits go to large numbers of 
eligible people. If so, the law is conclusive. Officials have no room to 
maneuver; they are strictly bound. Call this mandatory legalism. If a 
statute prohibits approaches that would allow ineligible people to 
receive benefits, the legal question is at an end, and consequentialism 
is off-limits.  
 
watchdog group noting that “[t]he IRS is following the law,” as well as a vice president of 
conservative think tank that “[e]xpediency has been prioritized,” rather than delaying checks for 
weeks and months by cross-referencing data to eliminate dead recipients). 
 17.  See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1850–52;  see generally HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8 
(discussing administrative burdens in a wide variety of policy arenas). 
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But suppose, alternatively, that the law gives officials discretion to 
adopt various approaches, such that they can choose an approach that 
inadvertently but inevitably grants benefits to ineligibles without 
violating any statutory provision, if that is the price of giving benefits 
to more eligible individuals. For example, a statute involving voter 
registration might authorize states to adopt registration procedures 
that do not entirely screen out people who are ineligible. Or a statute 
providing free school meals for poor children might come with a 
general appropriation and give authority to state agencies to ascertain 
how best to ensure receipt by those who are eligible—authority that 
might include a license to make some mistakes.18 But some people 
might say that officials should not take this approach, even if they have 
the legal authority to do so, because it is a grievous wrong to use one’s 
discretion to give benefits to ineligibles. Call this discretionary 
legalism. 
In principle, mandatory legalism is right, if the statute really is 
conclusive. But in principle, extreme versions of discretionary 
legalism—where, it will be recalled, the statute is not conclusive—
would seem hard to defend: a grant of benefits to ten people who are 
almost (but not) eligible would appear to be a price worth paying in 
exchange for a grant of benefits to two million people who are in fact 
eligible. But granting benefits in violation of the law is no light thing, 
even if officials do have some discretion under the statute, and the 
correct tradeoff is not self-evident. Public officials encounter the 
problem frequently, and so do companies, universities, nonprofits, 
homeless shelters, hospitals, and others. It is a general truth that as the 
burdens of eligibility requirements increase, the class of people who 
receive a benefit may well include fewer ineligibles; and as those 
burdens loosen, there is an ever-growing risk that a benefit will go to 
people who should not be getting it.  
 
 18.  For example, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 provides a general 
appropriation to states for the administration of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(“SNAP”), but states are allowed to determine the best means of certifying which children are 
eligible for free school meals. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
234, §§ 4111–22, 122 Stat. 923, 1102–13; see generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric., DIRECT 
CERTIFICATION IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: : STATE IMPLEMENTATION 
PROGRESS REPORT TO CONGRESS—SCHOOL YEAR 2015–2016 AND 2016–2017 (2018), 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/resource-files/NSLPDirectCertification2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QBV5-24TF] (reporting to Congress “on State progress in direct certification in 
the National School Lunch Program”). 
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III.  A PILOT SURVEY 
We could imagine theoretical debates about these questions, and 
they would undoubtedly allow us to make progress. But let us now turn 
to an empirical question: What do people actually think about these 
issues? In a democracy, public officials are attentive to what members 
of the public think, and if most people turn out to favor an identifiable 
form of consequentialism, or instead embrace a form of legalism, their 
judgment would certainly be of interest. And for those who believe in 
“the wisdom of crowds,” a widespread public judgment might also have 
epistemic value. It might tell us something about what is right. 
We do not mean to say that the results of surveys should be taken 
to be decisive. Suppose that under the law, agencies have no statutory 
authority to give out benefits to people who are not eligible, even if a 
sludge-reduction strategy, producing that result, is the only way to 
ensure that benefits are received by a very large number of eligible 
people. Even if people approve of that result on consequentialist 
grounds, it is by hypothesis unlawful. Or suppose that some form of 
discretionary legalism is correct; those who embrace it would be 
unlikely to change their stance upon learning that, in surveys, most 
people disagree with them. Or suppose that some form of 
consequentialism is consistent with law and also can be shown to 
benefit a very large number of people. Should we reject it because most 
people do so in surveys? Committed consequentialists would not be 
willing to do so. They might insist that survey answers do not show 
informed or reflective thinking, and that their own approach is 
preferable in principle. 
For these reasons, we do not suggest or believe that, for 
democratic reasons, the views elicited in surveys should be taken as 
decisive. But they are of unquestionable interest. At a minimum, public 
officials, when deciding what to do, will be attuned to whether the 
public embraces or rejects one or another position. Surveys are 
informative about that question. 
With that point in mind, we conducted a pilot survey in which we 
attempted to elicit people’s views on the underlying questions in one 
substantive domain. We emphasize the word “pilot”; this was meant as 
a preliminary effort to obtain a sense of what people think. Using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we asked 407 people to consider four 
different scenarios, specifying different numbers of ineligible people 
who would receive EITC benefits under automatic enrollment. The 
survey was not nationally representative, but it did have a high degree 
of diversity. The participants were 60 percent male, 40 percent female; 
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30 percent Republican, 43 percent Democratic, 27 percent 
independent (that is, unassociated voters); 68 percent White, 14 
percent Asian, 7 percent Black, 4 percent Hispanic. We chose a within-
subjects design, in which all subjects saw all four scenarios, with the 
goal of promoting comparative assessments. 
We described four scenarios, reprinted below, and then asked the 
survey participants a simple question: whether they would approve of 
what we described as a “new approach” to the distribution of the EITC, 
which would have varying consequences. (Participants were asked a 
binary question: approve or disapprove.) The actual text read as 
follows: 
(1)  Under the new approach, the IRS would give the Earned 
Income Tax Credit only to the 4 million people who are actually 
eligible; no one would receive it who is not eligible. 
(2)  The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out 
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million 
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it. 
Of those, 3.98 million are eligible, but 20,000 are not. 
(3)  The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out 
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million 
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it. 
Of those, 3.9 million are eligible, but 100,000 are not. 
(4)  The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out 
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the 
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million 
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it. 
Of those, 3.5 million are eligible, but 500,000 are not. 
The aggregate results were straightforward. Very strong 
majorities approved of automatic enrollment in scenarios (1) and (2); 
a solid majority approved of automatic enrollment in scenario (3); and 
a solid majority rejected it in scenario (4). In short, most people 
rejected a legalist approach to these questions, in favor of a form of 
consequentialism. Even if 100,000 people would receive benefits to 
which they were not entitled, people would favor automatic 
enrollment. And when as many as 500,000 ineligible people would 
receive benefits, a substantial minority would nonetheless approve. It 
is noteworthy, however, that with those numbers, the majority 
disapproved, demonstrating that in scenario (4), many 
consequentialists would draw the line. 
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More specifically: For scenario (1), the approval rate was 89 
percent, with Democrats at 91 percent, independents at 90 percent, and 
Republicans at 85 percent. For scenario (2), the approval rate was 75 
percent, with Democrats at 84 percent, independents at 74 percent, and 
Republicans at 62 percent. For scenario (3), the approval rate was 61 
percent, with Democrats at 74 percent, independents at 54 percent, and 
Republicans at 50 percent. Lastly, for scenario (4), the approval rate 
was 44 percent, with Democrats at 49 percent, independents at 37 
percent, and Republicans at 42 percent. 
We expected to find significant differences across various lines, 
but in testing for statistical significance, we were surprised to find few 
differences along almost every line that we tested.19 In particular, we 
anticipated much higher approval ratings from Democrats rather than 
from Republicans, but even there, the picture is complicated, for the 
differences were less than stark. To be sure, there were significant 
differences between Republicans and Democrats in scenarios (2) and 
(3). Note, however, that the differences between the two parties is not 
statistically significant for scenarios (1) and (4), which makes it 
hazardous to say that we have found a consistent difference, on these 
issues, along party lines. In these circumstances, the relatively high 
 
 19.  For further details, see infra app. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Scenario (1) Scenario (2) Scenario (3) Scenario (4)
Figure 1. Approval Rates by Political Affiliation
Overall Democrats Independents Republicans
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level of agreement among Democrats, independents, and Republicans 
is the main story. 
Analysis of a range of demographic differences also failed to find 
significant differences, perhaps because of the relatively small sample 
sizes. Surprisingly, we were unable to find differences between men 
and women or along lines of race or educational attainment. The few 
significant differences that we did find tell no clear or obvious tale, and 
we would not make much of them. For example, we found a statistically 
significant result for those in the $120,000–$149,999 salary range in 
scenarios (3) and (4): those in this income category (the second 
highest) showed lower approval ratings than did people in other 
income categories. With respect to age, we found that 50–64-year-olds 
showed a significantly lower approval rate in scenario (3), and those 65 
and over showed a significantly lower approval rate in scenario (1).  
Because these findings seem a bit random, and do not show 
differences across all four scenarios, it would be hazardous to draw 
general lessons from them. The important story is shown by the 
aggregate data, and by the significant, but relatively modest, 
differences between Republicans and Democrats in scenarios (2) and 
(3). 
CONCLUSION 
There has been growing attention to administrative burdens and 
sludge, with a mounting awareness that many eligible people are 
deterred or prevented from obtaining benefits or opportunities to 
which they are legally entitled. The strongest justification for such 
burdens is that they are necessary to screen out ineligible people. 
Whether this is an adequate justification depends on whether we 
embrace consequentialism, mandatory legalism, or discretionary 
legalism, and how we specify each of these approaches.  
In principle, and if the law permits it, we would argue in favor of 
a form of consequentialism. Suppose that a sludge-reduction approach 
ensures that a very large number of eligible people receive an economic 
benefit who otherwise would not, while also ensuring that a very small 
number of ineligible people also end up with that benefit. The details 
matter, but in general, we would favor that approach. We would also 
be willing to embrace consequentialism even if the numbers were not 
so overwhelmingly supportive of sludge reduction. But we do not mean 
here to take a specific stand on what consequentialism entails, or about 
the appropriate conclusions when particular numbers are presented. 
The substantive area undoubtedly matters. Reasonable 
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consequentialists might offer different conclusions in the domains of 
antipoverty programs, voting, abortion, student visas, and occupational 
licenses. In one area, they might tolerate a grant of a good or 
opportunity to ineligibles, without also committing themselves to the 
same level of toleration in another area. 
In the particular domain of the EITC, a pilot survey suggests that 
most people embrace consequentialism, and that they are willing to 
accept the grant of benefits to numerous ineligible people if that is the 
price of granting benefits to far more numerous eligible people. It 
appears that people will accept automatic enrollment unless it means 
that benefits are also granted to an extraordinarily high number of 
ineligible people.  
A great deal of research remains to be done. In the future, it would 
be valuable to probe the normative and legal issues in more detail. 
Recall mandatory legalism and suppose that a form of 
consequentialism would result in a violation of relevant statutes—
perhaps because it would unlawfully grant economic benefits to 
ineligible people. If so, that approach should not be adopted. But how 
many and which statutes are best understood in this way? How many 
and which statutes should alternatively be understood to give agencies 
discretion to take sludge-reducing steps that admittedly give out 
benefits to people who are not eligible? It would be most valuable to 
obtain answers to these questions. 
It would also be valuable to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of what people think in different areas, and to explore 
whether there are differences along political or demographic lines. Our 
own study is a mere pilot in this domain, with a relatively small sample. 
We could do far more to probe what people actually think. Even now, 
however, we believe that a heavy burden of justification lies on those 
who would reject effective sludge-reduction efforts, including 
automatic enrollment, even if the unintended but inevitable 
consequence would be to benefit some or even many people who are 
not in fact eligible. So long as sludge-reduction efforts are consistent 
with law and basic principle, the survey results here would suggest that 
those efforts deserve support, at least if they are necessary to ensure 
that large numbers of eligible people receive potentially life-changing 
or life-saving benefits that they would not otherwise receive.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. This table reports the results of the survey discussed in 
the text. More specifically, it reports the approval ratings for each 
demographic group with respect to the four scenarios. Recall that in 
these scenarios, the IRS gives the EITC to 4 million people: 
(1) All of whom are actually eligible for the EITC; 
(2) 3.98 million of whom are eligible, but 20,000 are not eligible 
for the EITC; 
(3) 3.9 million of whom are eligible, but 100,000 are not eligible 
for the EITC; or 
(4) 3.5 million of whom are eligible, but 500,000 are not eligible 
for the EITC. 
 
CATEGORY 
APPROVAL RATINGS OF SCENARIOS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TOTAL 
APPROVAL RATE 89% 75% 61% 44% 
GENDER     
Male  88% 76% 65% 47% 
Female  90% 73% 57% 39% 
PARTY ID     
Democrat  91% 84% 74% 49% 
Republican  85% 62% 50% 42% 
Independent  90% 74% 54% 37% 
EDUCATION     
< High School 100% 100% 0% 0% 
High School / GED 86% 86% 79% 59% 
Some College 88% 72% 53% 38% 
Bachelor’s Degree 89% 72% 60% 42% 
Master’s Degree 92% 81% 69% 55% 
Professional 
Degree 90% 80% 70% 30% 
Doctoral Degree 100% 50% 75% 50% 
RACE     
Asian 93% 81% 67% 33% 
Black  90% 72% 76% 62% 
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Hispanic 88% 88% 65% 53% 
Native American 75% 50% 25% 0% 
White 89% 72% 59% 44% 
More than one 81% 86% 67% 48% 
AGE     
Under 24 years 91% 81% 78% 43% 
25 to 29 years 84% 86% 71% 59% 
30 to 49 years 93% 73% 59% 44% 
50 to 64 years 88% 62% 40% 26% 
65 years and over 62% 54% 54% 31% 
INCOME     
Less than $30,000 89% 77% 72% 57% 
$30,000–$59,999 89% 78% 64% 45% 
$60,000_$89,999 92% 70% 56% 41% 
$90,000–$119,999 82% 66% 64% 40% 
$120,000–$149,999 88% 81% 35% 19% 
$150,000 and more 95% 86% 59% 36% 
 
Figure 2. Significance testing 
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
 
SCENARIOS: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RACE 
    
Asian 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.)      
Black 0.620 0.670 1.710 3.209* 
 (0.533) (0.473) (0.329) (0.020)      
Hispanic 0.509 1.759 1.088 2.667 
 (0.426) (0.472) (0.888) (0.091)      
Native American 0.386 0.289 0.273 0.142 
 (0.420) (0.256) (0.251) (0.231)      
White 0.876 0.864 0.955 1.761 
 (0.811) (0.707) (0.892) (0.086)      
More than one 0.456 1.368 1.018 1.700 
 (0.292) (0.662) (0.976) (0.328) 
AGE 
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Under 24 years 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.)      
25 to 29 years 0.575 1.577 0.680 1.999 
 (0.322) (0.359) (0.376) (0.072)      
30 to 49 years 1.438 0.663 0.410* 0.898 
 (0.491) (0.306) (0.018) (0.743)      
50 to 64 years 0.829 0.409 0.206*** 0.483 
 (0.765) (0.060) (0.001) (0.100)      
65 years and over 0.173* 0.394 0.362 0.492 
 (0.019) (0.170) (0.131) (0.285) 
EDUCATION 
    
< High School 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.)      
High School / GED 2.086 0.676 18.62 6.211 
 (0.663) (0.822) (0.089) (0.271)      
Some College 2.482 0.282 4.860 2.480 
 (0.578) (0.450) (0.344) (0.577)      
Bachelor’s Degree 2.733 0.263 6.077 2.576 
 (0.536) (0.424) (0.277) (0.559)      
Master’s Degree 3.802 0.465 9.223 4.051 
 (0.424) (0.650) (0.185) (0.391)      
Professional Degree 2.242 0.343 11.97 1.736 
 (0.660) (0.554) (0.167) (0.752)      
Doctoral Degree 5.530 0.0609 7.021 2.496 
 (0.461) (0.150) (0.319) (0.623) 
GENDER 
    
Female 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Male 0.866 1.232 1.430 1.249 
 (0.672) (0.405) (0.118) (0.311) 
INCOME 
    
Less than $30,000 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.)      
$30,000–$59,999 1.059 0.975 0.726 0.646 
 (0.901) (0.945) (0.334) (0.148)      
$60,000–$89,999 1.646 0.648 0.554 0.548 
 (0.331) (0.223) (0.076) (0.055)      
$90,000–$119,999 0.542 0.452 0.652 0.471* 
 (0.236) (0.061) (0.294) (0.046)      
$120,000–$149,999 0.826 1.300 0.246** 0.200** 
 (0.779) (0.646) (0.005) (0.003)      
$150,000 and more 2.256 1.714 0.597 0.414 
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 (0.380) (0.421) (0.329) (0.088) 
PARTY ID 
    
Democrat 1 1 1 1 
 (.) (.) (.) (.)      
Republican 0.572 0.322*** 0.356*** 0.766 
 (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300)      
Independent 0.744 0.512* 0.391*** 0.660  
(0.485) (0.035) (0.001) (0.119) 
N 407 407 407 407 
 
